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Abstract Several observers suggest that we may have undergone a shift from a
post-crime to a pre-crime society in which the principal focus has become the
pursuit of security by anticipating and forestalling future harms, rather than
responding retrospectively to harms that have actually happened. This paper is
about the economics of pre-crime interventions. It investigates the welfare conse-
quences of risk assessment and early interventions to prevent individuals from
engaging in criminal activities. Furthermore, it deals with the question of what
constitutes an optimal application of risk assessment and early intervention. Finally,
it presents three rules of thumb to identify conditions where pre-crime intervention
may be welfare enhancing.
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1 Introduction
In the contemporary society, there appears to be a tendency towards a ‘‘risk
society’’.1 Consistent with this tendency, is a change in perspectives on crime.
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1 This tendency is described by authors as Ulrich Beck (1992), Giddens (1999), and David (2001).
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Zedner (2007, p. 262) recently described this change: ‘‘In important respects we are
on the cusp of a shift from a post- to a pre-crime society, a society, in which the
possibility of forestalling risks competes with and even takes precedence over
responding to wrongs done. In consequence, the post-crime orientation of criminal
justice is increasingly overshadowed by the pre-crime logic of security.’’2 In a pre-
crime society, people demand measures to prevent ‘‘potential criminals’’ from
engaging in criminal behaviour. For that purpose risk assessment and early
intervention may be used.
Risk assessment refers to the process of estimating the likelihood that an
individual will engage in criminal behaviour. In general three main approaches can
be distinguished: unstructured clinical assessment, actuarial assessment, and
structured clinical assessment (Philipse 2005). The unstructured clinical assessment
refers to a practice where each individual professional estimates risk on the basis of
a subjective selection and weighing of information. Actuarial risk assessment is
based on factors that have been shown to correlate with future behaviour. A large
number of risk assessment tools fall within this category. Structured clinical
assessments take actuarial assessments as a starting point, but allow individual
variations.
By early interventions we mean interventions to prevent high risk individuals
from engaging in criminal behaviour. Early interventions may be aimed at
preventing first time offences or recidivism. There are numerous programs that aim
at reducing future criminal behaviour. Examples include pre-school programs and
juvenile offender programs, such a multi-systemic therapy.3 Basically, these
programs try to mitigate risk factors and stimulate protective factors.4
There is an extensive literature on risk taxation and early intervention, especially
in the fields of criminology and forensic psychiatry. In the law and economics of
crime, hardly any attention seems to be paid to pre-crime interventions. The focus is
mainly on post-crime interventions, that is law enforcement. The basic idea is that
law enforcement yields a welfare gain if the benefits from the deterrent and
incapacitation function of sanctions exceeds the costs of law enforcement.5
In this paper we look at the case where ‘‘pre-crime interventions’’ are introduced
given the system of ‘‘post-crime interventions’’. Adding pre-crime interventions to
the existing system may lead to a reduction in crime, thus reducing the harm
2 The term pre-crime society is derived from a story by Philip K. Dick published in 1956 about a future
society where murders are prevented before they happened. The concept became well-known after
Spielberg’s 2002 movie ‘‘Minority Report’’. The film’s story takes place in 2054 when three ‘pre-cogs’,
bio-engineered young people, are able to foresee murders. They are the principal resource of a ‘pre-crime’
unit, the chief of which is John Anderton (played by Tom Cruise), who arrest people for murders they
have not yet committed. See: Wright (2008, p. 482).
3 Aos et al. (2004) present on overview of (the costs and benefits of) relevant programs.
4 The so-called risk factor prevention paradigm suggests that risk factors should be reduced while
protective factors are enhanced (Farrington 2008, p. 80). Risk factors are characteristics that make it more
likely that an individual will choose to violate the law, while protective factors are characteristics that
make it less likely that an individual will opt for criminal behaviour. See for instance Loeber and
Farrington (2000).
5 See for instance Polinsky et al. (2008). The seminal paper on the deterrent function is Becker (1968).
The incapacitation function is analyzed in Shavell (1987), see also Miceli (2010).
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inflicted on victims and reducing the need for law enforcement activities. Since
there are both costs and benefits associated with risk assessment and early
intervention, we investigate the welfare implications. More specifically: what
constitutes an optimal application of risk assessment and early intervention?
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 investigates the welfare
consequences that can be expected if risk assessment is used as a guide for early
intervention. More specifically, we look at the welfare implication if ‘‘pre-crime
interventions’’ are introduced, given the existing system of ‘‘post-crime interven-
tions’’. We investigate the optimal application of risk assessment and early
intervention. Section 3 makes a step from theory to practice. After discussion
practical problems, this section presents three rules of thumb to identify conditions
where pre-crime interventions may be welfare enhancing. Section 4 concludes.
2 Investigating welfare consequences
Ideally, risk assessment correctly predicts whether or not an individual will engage
in criminal behaviour, and early intervention effectively prevents high risk
individuals from engaging in criminal behaviour. In practice, however, not all
predictions will be correct and not all interventions will be effective. In 2.1 we look
at the accuracy of risk assessment, in 2.2 we consider the costs and benefits of early
intervention. Combining insights from 2.1 to 2.2, in 2.3 we turn to the optimal
application.
2.1 Accuracy of risk assessment
A perfectly accurate risk assessment instrument, identifies individuals that will
engage in criminal behaviour as ‘‘high risk’’ (true positives), and identifies
individuals that will not engage in criminal behaviour as ‘‘low risk’’ (true
negatives). In practice, there will also be false positives and false negatives. We
indicate the number of true positives, false positives, false negatives and true
negatives: a, b, c, and d respectively. See Table 1.
Without loss of generality, we normalize group size to one, that is:
a ? b ? c ? d = 1. In the absence of pre-crime intervention, the probability of
crime p is equal to a ? c.
Table 1 Numbers of true positives, false positives, false negatives and true negatives
Behaviour in the absence of precrime intervention Total
Crime No crime
Risk assessment
High risk a b a ? b
Low risk c d c ? d
Total a ? c b ? d a ? b ? c ? d
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The numbers of true positives, false positives, false negatives and true negatives
depend on the accuracy of the risk assessment instrument. There is an extensive
literature on the accuracy of risk assessment instruments, especially in the field op
epidemiology and forensic psychiatry. In these fields, risk assessment instruments
are inter alia used to predict illness or problematic behaviour in the future. In this
literature, the accuracy of risk assessment instruments is generally discussed in
terms of a pair of indices: sensitivity and specificity.6
Sensitivity refers to the ability of a test to detect criminals of the future. It is the
proportion of actual positives which are correctly identified as such. This proportion
is equal to a/(a ? c). This proportion is often called the ‘‘true positive rate’’, TPR.
A fraction of the individuals that actually will engage in criminal behaviour will in
the test be classified as ‘‘not criminal’’. The ‘‘false negative rate’’, FNR, is equal to
c/(a ? c).
Specificity refers to the ability of a test to detect individuals who will not engage
in criminal behaviour. It is the proportion of ‘‘not criminal individuals’’ correctly
predicted to be ‘‘not criminal’’. This proportion is equal to d/(b ? d). This
proportion is often called the ‘‘true negative rate’’, TNR. A fraction of the
individuals that actually are ‘‘not criminal’’ will in the test by classified as
‘‘criminal’’. The ‘‘false positive rate’’, FPR, is equal to b/(b ? d).7
The sensitivity and specificity of a test depends on the threshold level used in the
test. In order to increase the sensitivity of a test, one will have to accept a decrease
in selectivity. There is an unavoidable sensitivity–specificity-trade-off. In the
literature this trade-off is frequently depicted by a ROC-curve (ROC = receiver
operating characteristic).8
The more accurate the test, the larger ‘‘the area under the curve’’. This area can
be expressed in terms of an ‘‘AUC-value’’. A rough rule of thumb is that the
accuracy of tests with AUCs between 0.50 and 0.70 is low; between 0.70 and 0.90,
the accuracy is moderate; and it is high for AUCs over 0.90. (Streiner and Cairney
2007, p. 125). Figure 1 shows the ROC-curve for a moderate test with an AUC-
value of 0.77.
In principle, policy makers may choose between different points on the ROC-
curve. From an efficiency point of view, what is the optimal choice?
6 See for instance Simon et al. (1990), Quinsey et al. (1998), Philipse (2005) or Weiss (2008).
7 Sensitivity and specifity are, in fact, two conditional probabilities that characterize the accuracy of a
test. Kirstein and Schmidtchen (1997) follow a similar approach in their discussion of judicial detection
skill. The basic idea of their approach is taken from Heiner (1983, 1985), who refers to the literature in
experimental psychology about imperfect detections of signals. In the economic literature on law
enforcement, one often finds a distinction between type I errors and type II errors. In law the natural
starting point is the null hypothesis that the defendant is innocent. A type I error is the rejection of a true
hypothesis, i.e. the conviction of an innocent person. A type II error is accepting a false hypothesis, i.e.
the acquittal of a guilty person. Thus defined, a test with a high specifity has a low type I error rate and a
sensitive test has a low type II error rate. Some authors start from the null hypothesis that the defendant is
guilty and the obtain definitions of type I and type II errors that the one described here. See e.g. Ehrlich
(1982), Miceli (1990), Garupa (1997), and Rizzolli et al. (2009). By speaking about ‘‘the probability of
mistaken acquittal’’ and ‘‘the probability of mistaken conviction’’ Polinsky et al. (2008) avoid this
problem.
8 See inter alia Metz (1978), Swets (1992), Mossman (1994), Swets et al. (2000).
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The choice of a point on the ROC-curve determines the number of true positives,
false positives, false negatives, and true negatives. The optimal choice depends on
the costs and benefits associated with these outcomes. In 2.2 these costs and benefits
are discussed.
2.2 Costs and benefits
Figure 2 presents the consequences of early intervention based on the risk
assessment summarized in Table 1. The left part of Fig. 2 summarizes the case
where risk assessment and early intervention are not applied. The right part shows
the case where risk assessment and early intervention are applied. Comparing both
sides of the figure, we may learn whether or not the application of precrime
intervention yields a welfare gain.
We first look at the left side of Fig. 2. In the absence of risk assessment and
precrime intervention a fraction (a ? c) of the population will engage in criminal
behaviour. This behaviour will inflict harm on victims CH = H. Furthermore,
criminal behaviour gives rise to law enforcement activities. Enforcement costs are
CE = E. The sum of harm and enforcement costs is CS = CH ? CE. If harm occurs,
CS = H ? E = S. A fraction (b ? d) will not engage in criminal behaviour; in that
case CS = 0. Consequently, the costs without risk assessment and precrime
intervention are equal to:
Cwithout ¼ ða þ cÞS ð1Þ
Next, we consider the right side of Fig. 2. Six categories can be distinguished:
effective intervention, ineffective intervention, unnecessary intervention, self
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A fraction (a ? b) is considered to be high risk individuals. A fraction a/(a ? b)
of the high risk individuals are true positives. That is: in the absence of early
interventions these individuals will actually engage in criminal behaviour. By
means of early interventions, a fraction a of the true positives will be prevented
from engaging in criminal behaviour: effective intervention. A fraction (1-a) will
still engage in criminal behaviour: ineffective intervention.
A fraction b/(a ? b) of the high risk individuals are false positives. That is: in the
absence of early interventions these individuals will not engage in criminal
behaviour. In the case of false positives, individuals that are not inclined towards
criminal behaviour are actually treated as potential criminals. That is, false positives
give rise stigmatization. A fraction b of the false positives will still refrain from
criminal behaviour: unnecessary intervention. Due to self-fulfilling prophecies, a
fraction (1-b) of the false positives will be induced to engage in criminal
behaviour, thus increasing harm and the need for post-crime interventions: self
fulfilling prophecy.
A fraction (c ? d) is considered to be low risk individuals. A fraction d/(c ? d)
of the low risk individuals are true negatives. That is, in the absence of early
interventions these individuals will not engage in criminal behaviour: true negative.
A fraction c/(c ? d) of the low risk individuals are false negatives. That is, in the
absence of early interventions these individuals will engage in criminal behaviour:
false negative.The costs associated with these six categories can be found in
Table 2. Consider, for instance, the category effective intervention. Because
effective intervention prevents individuals from engaging in criminal behaviour,
Table 2 Costs associated with risk assessment and early intervention














Fraction: a Fraction: (1 - a) Fraction: b Fraction: (1 - b)
CS = 0 CS = S CS = 0 CS = S
CD = D CD = D CD = D CD = D
CI = I CI = I CI = I CI = I
CX = 0 CX = 0 CX = X CX = X
CEI = D ? I CII = S ? D ? I CUI = D ? I ? X CSP = S ? D ? I ? X
CTP = aCEI ?
(1-a)CII = D ? I ? (1-a)S
CFP = bCII ?
(1-b)CSP = D ? I ? X ? (1-b)S
Low
risk
False negative True negative
CS = S CS = 0
CD = D CD = D
CI = 0 CI = 0
CX = 0 CX = 0
CFN = S ? D CTN = D
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no harm is inflicted on potential victims (CH = 0), since there is no crime there is no
need for law enforcement activities (CE = 0). Consequently CS = 0. Since risk
assessment and early intervention are applied, there are costs involved in diagnosis
(CD = D) and intervention (CI = I). And since the individuals in this category are
inclined towards criminal behaviour, no one is incorrectly treated as a potential
criminal CX = 0. CX are the costs due to the fact that a person that is not inclined
towards criminal behaviour is actually treated as a potential criminal (false
positives). Consequently, the costs associated with effective intervention CEI are
equal to D ? I.
The costs with risk assessment and precrime intervention are equal to:
Cwith ¼ aCTP þ bCFP þ cCFN þ dCTN ð2Þ
From Table 2 it immediately follows that these costs are equal to:
Cwith ¼ a½D þ I þ ð1  aÞS þ b½D þ I þ X þ ð1  bÞS þ cðS þ DÞ þ dD ð3Þ
The cost change that results from the introduction of precrime intervention is equal
to:
Cdif ¼ Cwith  Cwithout ð4Þ
Substituting (1) and (3) in (4) and rewriting, learns that a welfare gain (Cdif \ 0) is
obtained if:
D þ ða þ bÞI þ b 1  bð ÞS þ bX\aaS ð5Þ
The four terms on the left hand side represent cost increases induced by risk
assessment and early intervention.
– The first term are the costs involved in testing as such.
– The second term represents the costs associated with interventions directed at
‘‘high risk’’ individuals.
– The third term represents an increase in harm due to ‘‘self fulfilling prophecies’’,
i.e. false positives induced to engage is harmful behaviour.
– The forth term comprises disadvantages caused to false positives.
The right hand side represents the cost decrease induced by risk assessment and
early intervention.
– The final term reflects costs saving (reduction in harm and law enforcement
costs) due to the fact a fraction of the true positives are prevented from engaging
in harmful behaviour.9
If, and only if, the condition formulated in (5) is met, then one could say ‘‘pre-crime
pays’’.10
9 Note that Cdif reflects cost changes due the introduction of risk assessment and early intervention
relative to the status quo. That is: relative to the existing situation where only post-crime interventions are
applied. Effective pre-crime interventions economize on costs associated with post-crime inventions.
10 Though it is, of course, an empirical question whether the condition will ever be met, this possibility
can not be ruled out a priori. (Contra: MacNeil 2005).
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Consider the special case where perfect risk assessment instruments (b = 0 and
c = 0) and perfect intervention mechanisms (a = 1, b = 1) are available. In that
case, a welfare gain can be achieved if D \ a(S–I), i.e. if the costs of diagnosis are
smaller than the difference between avoided harm and law enforcement costs and
the costs of intervention (in the high risk subgroup).
In the next section we consider the case where risk assessment instruments and
intervention mechanisms are imperfect.
2.3 Optimal application
In principle, policy makers may choose between different points on the ROC-curve.
This choice determines the number of true positives, false positives, false negatives,
and true negatives. As summarized in Table 2, these four outcomes have different
cost implications. From an efficiency point of view, what is the optimal choice?
Combing the insights from Sect. 2.1 and 2.2, the optimum can be found. The
ROC-curve represents combination of TPR and FPR that are attainable, given the
possibilities of risk assessment. From 2.2 we may infer that a particular cost
reduction can be obtained by different combinations of TPR and FPR. These
combinations can be represented by an iso-cost curve. The iso-cost curve for a
specific level of Cdif is given by (see ‘‘Appendix’’):
TPR ¼ D 
Cdif
pðaS  IÞ þ
ð1  pÞ
p
ð1  bÞS þ I þ X
aS  I FPR ð6Þ
Given the parameters, a set of parallel iso-cost curves may be added to Fig. 1.
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Fig. 3 Optimal trade-off
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In the optimum, the best attainable iso-cost curve is tangent to the ROC-curve.
Consequently, the optimal point on the ROC-curve is characterized by11:
oTPR
oFPR
¼ 1  p
p
 1  bð ÞS þ I þ X
aS  I ð7Þ
The iso-cost curve is upward sloping if aS - I [ 0, or equivalently if CFN [ CTP.
That is: in cases where early intervention may be welfare enhancing.12
From (7) we may infer that the optimum will move to a point situated on ‘‘north-
east’’ of the ROC curve if a, b, p or S increases and I of X decreases (the
comparative statics can be found in the appendix).13 That is: in order to be able to
intervene in a lager part in the lives of ‘‘criminal individuals’’, it is considered
acceptable to intervene in a larger part of the life of individuals that are actually not
criminal.
Table 3 explains the influence of the parameters on the optimal trade-off between
TPR and FPR.
Table 3 Parameters influencing the optimal trade-off
Optimum moves to a point on ‘‘flatter
part’’ of the ROC-curve if
Explanation: Reason why change in parameter leads to the
choice of higher TPR and FPR, i.e. higher sensitivity and lower
specificity.
a increases The larger the fraction of true positives that is actually
prevented from engaging into criminal behaviour, the larger
the benefits from tracing criminal individuals.
b increases The larger the fraction of false positives that, despite of
needless interventions, do not engage in ‘‘criminal
behaviour’’, the less the losses induced by wrongfully treating
someone as a potential criminal.
p increases The larger the fraction of a group that is inclined towards
‘‘criminal behaviour’’, the smaller the numerical
consequences of a given probability of false positives and the
less reason to keep the false positive rate low.
S increases The larger the size of potential harm and the costs of law
enforcement, the larger the gains from timely tracing
potential criminals.
I decreases The lower the costs involved in intervening in the lives of
individuals identified as potential criminals, the lower the
costs due to intervening in the lives of false positives.
X decreases The lower the losses due to being incorrectly treated as
potential criminal X, the lower the costs due to intervening in
the lives of false positives.
11 Similar expressions can be found in the literature on medical tests. See inter alia Metz (1978, p. 296),
Swets (1992, p. 525), Zweig and Campbell (1993, p. 572), Swets et al. (2000, p. 9), Streiner and Cairney
(2007, p. 126).
12 From table 2 it is clear that CFP  CTN ¼ ð1  bÞS þ I þ Xand CFN  CTP ¼ aS  I. Hence, (7) may
also be expressed as: oTPRoFPR ¼ 1pp  CFPCTNCFNCTP.
13 Note that the optimal trade-off does not depend on D, the costs of diagnosis. D reflects the costs of
using a test that is characterized by a specific ROC-curve.
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3 From theory to practice
In the preceding sections we considered risk assessment and early intervention from
a theoretical perspective. In this section we make a step from theory to practice.
First, we present an empirical illustration, then we discuss some practical problems,
and finally, we present three rules of thumb.
3.1 Empirical illustration
In the literature numerous examples can be found of tests that try to assess the risk
of problematic behaviour. A fine example is ‘‘The adolescent risk behaviour screen’’
(ARBS) (Jankowski et al. 2007).14 Based on a concise questionnaire, which takes
generally less than 10 min to complete, ARBS identifies teenagers expected to
engage in multiple problem behaviour. Based on the ROC-curve representing the
test, a high AUC-value of 0.91 is obtained. For a particular point on the ROC-curve,
the sensitivity is 0.82 and the specificity is 0.83.15 Table 4 summarizes the test
results. For convenience, total group size is normalized to 1000 (based on 3583
observations).
From Table 4 we may infer that a positive test results implies a 15-times higher
probability of multi problem behaviour (87/239 = 36.4 vs. 19/761 = 2.5%). This
result seems to produce a very strong argument in favor of intervention. It remains
to be seen, however, whether this holds true. Out of 239 testing positive, 152 are
false positives. If interventions are based on this test results, almost 2 out of 3
interventions will hit the wrong persons. In other words, only 1 out of 3 measures
will be on target.
3.2 Practical problems
As explained above, Table 4 corresponds to a specific point on the ROC-curve
representing the test. Choosing another point on the ROC-curve, implies a change in
Table 4. Moving to a point on a ‘‘flatter part’’ of the ROC-curve, on the one hand
yields an increase in sensitivity. The number of true positives will increase, thus





Positive 87 152 239
Negative 19 742 761
Total 106 894 1,000
14 In the literature numerous examples can be found of studies that explicitly address the accuracy of
instruments to predict future violent behaviour or criminal recidivism. See e.g. Stattin and Magnusson
(1989), Mossman (1994), Philipse (2005), and Quinsey et al. (1998).
15 This point is alleged to optimize ‘‘the balance between sensitivity and specificity’’, though it is not
explicitly derived from an optimization procedure.
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enabling a reduction in harm. On the other hand, this change yields a decrease in
specificity. The number of false positives will increase. This not only leads to
unnecessary costs, it may also give rise to stigmatization and self fulfilling
prophecies. Looking for the optimal point on the ROC-curve, effectively amounts to
weighing the costs and benefits related to different points.
Applying (7), it is in theory straightforward to find the optimal point. In practice,
it is not that simple. Finding an optimum, requires insight into the cost changes as
shown in Table 2. Some of these costs can be computed rather easily; e.g. the costs
of intervention as such. For several reasons, it may be more difficult to calculate the
size of harm that may be prevented by early interventions. This is because criminal
careers depend on the occurrence of ‘‘life-events’’.16 Furthermore, during a criminal
career a criminal will cause harm at different points in time. The size of harm H is in
fact the present value of harm inflicted at different points in time (cf. Cohen 1998).
It may be even more difficult to assess the value of stigmatization and to estimate
the probability of self fulfilling prophecies.17
3.3 Rules of thumb
The optimal application of risk assessment depends on the results that will be
obtained when early interventions are based on this assessment. For a given test, the
choice of a threshold determines the numbers of true positives, false positives, false
negatives and true negatives. And these four possible outcomes yield divergent costs
and benefits.
A great deal of information is necessary to determine to optimal application of risk
assessment and early intervention. Consequently, it will be difficult to realize an
optimal application. The preceding analysis, however, suggest three rules of thumb.
The application of risk assessment and early intervention should be reserved to cases:
1. where there are good possibilities to predict and influences future behaviour,
2. where there is substantial harm and prevalence, and
3. where the costs are low.
3.3.1 Ad 1. Good possibilities to predict and influence future behaviour
It must be possible to predict the relevant behaviour rather accurately. That is, the
available test must have good scores on sensitivity and specificity. To arrive at an
16 The ‘‘life-course view on the development of crime’’ (developmental criminology) suggests that
criminal careers depend on life-events. Important changes in life (professional, military, marital) may act
as turning pints in criminal careers. See inter alia Sampson and Laub (2003, 2005), Blokland and
Nieuwbeerta (2005).
17 In empirical research often only part of these components is actually quantified. Because of the
difficulties involved in calculating all the costs and benefits of early interventions, some studies focus on
the costs and savings to the government. An example can be found in a study of the Perry Preschool
Project: ‘‘The savings to the government ($25,437) are more than twice as large as the program costs
($12, 1418), yielding net savings to the government of $13,289).’’ (Greenwood et al. 2001, p. 137).
A more recent studies tries to quantify costs and benefits for society at large, and reports a positive net
present value (Belfield, et al. 2006).
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optimal trade-off between sensitivity and specificity, one needs to have insight into
the consequences of early intervention.
Furthermore, there must be possibilities to effectively influence future behaviour.
Effective instruments are characterized by the fact that a large part of the true
positives abstains from criminal behaviour (high value of a), and that a large
fraction of the false positives (nevertheless) does not engage in criminal behaviour
(high value of b).
As explained above, an increase in a and b moves the optimum to a point on the
flatter part of the ROC-curve.
It is important to note that possibilities to predict and influence behaviour change
during lifetime. More specifically, these possibilities tend to change in opposite
directions. For very young children, on the one hand it is hardly possible to predict
whether they will develop a criminal career. On the other hand, there are good
opportunities to influence behaviour. For ‘‘hard core criminals’’, there are good
opportunities to predict behaviour, but it is hardly possible to influence behaviour.
These considerations suggest that there may be an optimal age interval for the
application of risk assessment and early intervention. This interval probably
corresponds to adolescence, i.e. the phase where most criminal careers start.18
3.3.2 Ad 2. Substantial harm and prevalence
Provided there are good possibilities to predict and influence future behaviour, a
more substantial reduction in expected harm can be achieved if the size of potential
harm is larger, and the fraction of the group that is inclined toward ‘‘criminal
behaviour’’ is larger (i.e. S and p are larger).19
As explained above, an increase in S and p moves the optimum to a point on the
flatter part of the ROC-curve. This implies the choice of a higher sensitivity and a
lower specificity. Consequently, a test that works well for a small group with a high
p, will not necessarily work well for a larger group with a smaller p.
3.3.3 Ad 3. Low costs
It goes without saying, that the application of risk assessment as such should not be
too expensive (low value of D), the costs involved in intervening in the lives of
individuals identified as potential criminals should be modest (low value of I), and
the losses due to being incorrectly treated as a potential criminal should be low (low
value of X).
As explained above, a decrease in I and X moves the optimum to a point on the
flatter part of the ROC-curve.
Other things being equal, benign interventions that do not lead to stigmatization
and do not inflict harm are more efficient than harm inflicting interventions.
18 The age-crime curve shows a significant rise in this phase (cf. Farrington 1986).
19 In the literature on risk management one often finds a so called ‘‘risk matrix’’. In the matrix,
phenomena are ordered on two dimensions: the probability of harm and the severity of harm. A large S
and p correspond to a point in the upper-right corner of a risk matrix.
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The practical implications of these rules, of course, depend on the actual
possibilities to predict and influence future behaviour etc. There is an extensive
literature on the application of risk assessment in order to predict the probability that
an individual will commit crime in the future. This literature, combined with the
rules of thumb, gives some indications on the type of cases where precrime
interventions can be expected to be welfare enhancing.
The main findings of a recent meta-study on the probability that children will
enter ‘‘a life of crime’’ (Farrington and Welsh 2007), can be summarized as follows.
This probability depends on individual factors, family factors and environmental
factors. Individual factors: Low intelligence and attainment, and low empathy and
impulsiveness, are important risk factors for offending. Family factors: Criminal or
antisocial parent, large family size, poor parental supervision, parental conflict, and
disrupted families. Environmental factors: Offenders disproportionately come from
deprived families, tend to have friends who are also delinquents, tend to attend high
delinquency-rate schools, and tend to live in deprived areas. It is hardly possible to
isolate the influence of specific factors. For one thing, multicolinearity is a serious
problem. Furthermore, there may be complicated interaction effects. The probability
of delinquent behaviour increases if the number of risk factors increases relative to
the number of protective factors (Loeber and Farrington 2000; Stouthamer-Loeber
et al. 2002).
Karoly et al. (2005, p. 114–116) present several key findings with respect to the
economics of early childhood investments. First, it is possible in principle for early
childhood interventions to generate short-term and longer-terms benefits that can
more than offset program costs. Second, the favourable economic returns from early
childhood intervention programs are not limited to smaller-scale demonstration
programs. Third, favourable benefit-cost ratios are achieved for both higher cost,
more-intensive programs and lower-cost, less-intensive programs. Fourth, there is
some evidence that effectively targeting program services generates more-favour-
able economic outcomes. Finally, increased program intensity tends to be associated
with declining returns.
A meta-study on predictors of adult offender recidivism leads to the following
insights (Gendreau et al. 1996). The strongest predictor domains are criminogenic
needs, criminal history/history of antisocial behaviour, social achievement, age/
gender/race, and family factors. Less robust predictors include intellectual
functioning, personal distress factors, and socioeconomic status in the family of
origin. Another meta-study presents an overview of risk assessment instruments
used to estimate the risk of recidivism; this study presents AUC-values (Coid et al.
2007).
There is some information on the costs (and benefits) of early intervention
programs. Aos et al. (2004) conclude that there is credible evidence that certain
well-implemented programs can achieve significantly more benefits than costs.
There is also evidence that specific programs yield more costs than benefits. There is
even evidence that some ‘‘well-meaning programs’’ may result in an increase in
crime (Petrosino et al. 2000).
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4 Conclusions
The question of whether risk assessment and early intervention will be welfare
enhancing and, if so, how risk assessment should be applied, depends on a number
of variables. These variables comprise the size of potential harm, the fraction of a
group inclined toward ‘‘criminal behaviour’’, the quality of risk assessment
instruments, the quality of intervention mechanisms, and the costs imposed on false
positives.
The application of risk assessment and early intervention should be reserved to
cases where there are good possibilities to predict and influences future behaviour,
where there is substantial harm and prevalence and where the costs are low. If
these conditions are not fulfilled, the application of risk assessment and early
intervention may be inefficient. Even worse, it may lead to an increase in the level
of crime.
Several developments may warrant a more extensive application. First, there may
be an improvement in the quality of instruments to predict and influence future
behaviour. Second, there may be social developments, such as the rise of a risk
society. The risk society yields an increase in the subjective valuation of harm.
Furthermore, the subjective valuation of costs associated with false positives may
decrease.
A caveat is in order. As indicated, the subjective valuation of harm and the
valuation of costs associated with false positives may change over time. An increase
in subjective harm may be used as an argument for a change in the decision
threshold used in risk assessment. This would give rise to an increase in the number
of false positives, thus leading to dissatisfaction. Therefore, one would expect an
increase in the subjective costs associated with false positives. Consequently, one
would expect an adaptation of the decision threshold in order to reduce the number
of false positives. This mechanism would, in other words, give rise to ‘‘cycling of
decision thresholds’’ (Weaver and Richardson 2006). From an efficiency point of
view, it would be better to avoid this mechanism.
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Appendix
Iso-cost curve
The iso-cost curve is found by substituting (1) and (3) in (4):
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Cdif ¼ D þ ða þ bÞI þ b 1  bð ÞS þ bX  aaS
¼ D þ aðI  aSÞ þ bf 1  bð ÞS þ I þ Xg
¼ D þ ða þ cÞðI  aSÞ a
a þ c þ ðb þ dÞf 1  bð ÞS þ I þ Xg
b
b þ d
¼ D þ pðI  aSÞTPR þ ð1  pÞf 1  bð ÞS þ I þ XgFPR
Hence:
pðaS  IÞTPR ¼ D  Cdif þ ð1  pÞf 1  bð ÞS þ I þ XgFPR
Therefore, the iso-cost curve for cost level Cdif ¼ Cdif is given by (6):
Comparative statics
The influence of parameters on the optimal trade-off between TPR and FPR is
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